A Curtain-Raiser on the 12th Xiangshan Forum in Beijing
The 12th Xiangshan Forum is happening in Beijing from 17th to 19th September, 2025. The metaphorical show of force China puts up at this annual Dialogue, demonstrates the party-state’s commitment to shaping the defence and security world order, and have China-centric conversations on regional and global issues. In my comments to a story authored by Resham for StratNews Global, I discuss what we learned from the 11th September briefing and planning meeting about the Forum, and what the messaging and intent behind the event is. My detailed assessment is as follows:
Read Resham’s full story for SNG here.
The media briefing and planning meeting on September 11 essentially expounded the things to look out for at the upcoming 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. For example, it was announced that the theme for the forum shall be ‘Jointly Safeguarding the International Order, Promoting Peace and Development’. There is always some consistency in the themes at the Forum, and some new elements are added to demonstrate Chinese thinking on the state of the world. The 10th and 11th Fora, for example, respectively talked about ‘Common Security, Lasting Peace’ and ‘Promoting Peace for a Shared Future’. If read together, the three themes across the 10th, 11th and 12th Fora speak to China’s insecurities in the global order today – the need to secure “common security” (which is essentially about a commitment to sovereign equality of security, and non-interference in internal affairs); building a “shared future” (which is Beijing’s flagship agenda on promoting humankind’s common destiny); and focusing on mutual development and preservation of the international order (which can be considered a jibe at entities like the US, which are seeking today to chart a new geoeconomic order which curtails China’s rise).
Further, the schedule and agenda of the 12th Forum were revealed at the planning meeting. Again, the emphases on creating a China-centered regional order, while preserving the current international order as-is, were evident. Specifically, four plenary sessions and eight parallel sessions are planned, and topics under focus include “building a fair and reasonable global security governance system,” “enhancing strategic trust and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” and safeguarding the post-World War II international order.” With the first topic on global governance, there is some timeliness given the recent launch of Beijing’s Global Governance Initiative. This session is likely to see an expounding of the Initiative’s values. One of the parallel panels will focus on commemorating the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the ‘War of Resistance Against Japanese Agression’ – again, a relevant theme Beijing would do a lot of chest-thumping within. And one interesting session to watch out for would be the discussion on “new forms of warfare,” where observers could cull out China’s learnings and lessons from the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza.
As always, there are research educational exhibitions likely to be taking place on the sidelines of the Forum. The participants this time are expanded in the scope of their backgrounds. As explained at the briefing meeting, participants include representatives from developed nations, emerging powers, small and medium-sized countries, and states in conflict zones. Compared with previous years, there is also an expected marked increase in the participation of former senior military and political officials, and prominent scholars.
What is interesting to note in the exposition on participants, when compared with the 10th and 11th Fora, is that this time, there is no mention of young scholars and students participating in large numbers, and neither is there a mention of many “international organisations” being represented (the latter is quite consistent in the Forum’s messaging). Secondly, “states in conflict zones” is another interesting articulation, we have not seen previously before.
The Xiangshan forum always endeavour to present China’s priorities and insecurities in the world, and frame the conversation around its flagship projects as the solution. In the past few years, and this year, the three ‘Global Initiatives’ by Xi Jinping, on ‘Development’, ‘Security’ and now, ‘Governance’, have been put forth and articulated as China’s proposition to countries seeking a better world for themselves. Obviously, because it is hosted in Beijing, the CPC’s political priorities are also reflected – as an example, we see the session on the anti-Japanese aggression war victory being discussed, and in the past, we have also seen an ‘SCO+ Young Scholars’ delegation participating.
What is also different, as compared to say, the Munich Security Conference or the Davos Forum, is that European or transatlantic security is not at the centre of conversations – rather, the emphasis is on the perspectives of the “Asia-Pacific” and developing economies. When compared with the Shangri-La dialogue, what stands out at Xiangshan is the sheer diversity of officials, scholars and young students attending. The thematic discussions don’t necessarily go beyond security and defence, but participants feature an array of backgrounds ranging from the policy and economic departments of armed forces to intelligence officers.
Clearly, the latest purges in the PLA, targeting the Eastern Theater Command, the PLA Rocket Force, and the Joint Logistics Support Force, tell us that the armed forces are far from achieving the kind of discipline and cleanliness necessary for procurement processes and combat efficiency to be top-notch.
The parade obviously did its job by setting the context for this Forum, by pulling out the big guns amid the presence of many heads of state, and making a case that China has the strength and the willpower to secure its interests. What we are likely to see at Xiangshan is a relatively softer effort by senior Chinese military and political officials to seek cooperation and interoperability with defence-related attendees, but not necessarily the show of force we saw at the parade.
Needless to say, the Forum experience is supposed to present an image of China that is robust and resilient. Internally in both the CMC and the PLA, however, there is an un-ignorable turmoil, and Fora like Xiangshan are only endeavours Beijing uses to make the turmoil less promiscuous.